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Comment
THE PERIMETERS OF LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION IN MARYLAND
The purpose of this comment is to explore the current contours
of the duty element in an action for negligent misrepresentation in
which the resulting harm is limited to economic loss. In particular,
this comment will address the application of Jacques v. First National
Bank' to negligent misrepresentation claims arising out of arm's
length commercial transactions. Currently, sophisticated parties
acting at arm's length may not limit their liability for innocent but
negligent misrepresentations in precontractual negotiations. By al-
lowing the scope of liability for negligent misrepresentation to ex-
pand to this extent, the Maryland courts have ignored both
precedent and the sound policy2 of a limited scope of liability in tort
within the context of a business transaction.3
Under current Maryland law, a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation is established by showing: (a) the defendant, ow-
ing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently asserts a false state-
ment; (b) intending that the statement will be acted upon by the
plaintiff; (c) with knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on
1. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
2. In the field of purely economic loss ... the extension of the duty to use
care beyond special relationships has been sluggish and it is uncertain whether
it will (or should) be carried to the full extent that it has been in physical dam-
age cases. The source of the doubt is . . . the potentially limitless range of
economic harm. And while the history of tort law has been marked by increas-
ing abandonment of limitations based on similar considerations-usually with-
out the fulfillment of the dire predictions-it does not follow that such
considerations are without merit in all situations or at all times. In the present
context they may justify limiting the scope of defendant's duty of care at some
point short of its scope in physical damage cases.
2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS § 7.6, at 406-07 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY].
3. On the whole. . . courts have provided a remedy for negligent misrepre-
sentation principally against those who advise in essentially nonadversarial ca-
pacity. As against sellers and other presumed antagonists, on the other hand.
the tendency of most courts has instead been either to rely on deceit with the
requirement of scienter, however expanded, or to shift (by analogy to restitu-
tion or warranty) to strict liability ....
Id. at 412-13 (footnotes omitted). The treatise footnotes one anomaly to this proposi-
tion-Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982). For a dis-
cussion of Martens, see infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
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the statement and which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury;
(d) the plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement;
and (e) suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
An action for fraud is distinguishable from an action for negli-
gent misrepresentation in that the scope of liability for fraud is lim-
ited by the scienter requirement. The elements of fraud under
current Maryland law are: (1) that a representation made by the de-
fendant was false; (2) that either its falsity was known to the defend-
ant or the misrepresentation was made with such reckless
indifference to the truth to impute knowledge to the defendant;
(3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of de-
frauding the plaintiff; (4) that the plaintiff not only relied upon the
misrepresentation but had the right to rely upon it with full belief of
its truth, and that the plaintiff would not have done the thing from
which the damage resulted if it had not been made; and (5) that the
plaintiff suffered damage directly resulting from the misrepresenta-
tion.5 The scienter element for fraud requires a showing of inten-
tional suppression of material fact with the object of creating or
continuing a false impression.6 Furthermore, fraud must be proved
with clear and convincing evidence.7 This higher standard of proof,
along with the subjective evidence required to prove a defendant's
state of mind, serves to protect business parties acting honestly in a
commercial context.
The Maryland courts have consistently required that a special
relationship exist between the parties to support a negligent misrep-
resentation claim.' The contours of the "special relationship" re-
4. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 135, 492 A.2d 618, 627-28 (1985); Martens,
292 Md. at 333, 439 A.2d at 537.
5. Suburban Properties Management, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460, 204 A.2d
326, 329 (1964).
6. 2 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 2, § 7.3. at 393-94.
7. Scheve v. McPherson, 44 Md. App. 398, 406-07, 408 A.2d 1071, 1077 (1979).
8. See Martens, 292 Md. at 338 n.7, 439 A.2d at 539-40 n.7 (finding precontractual
negotiations gave rise to a special relationship between buyer and seller of a car dealer-
ship); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 220, 278
A.2d 12, 26 (1971) (finding knowledge possessed by a mortgage broker created special
relationship with clients giving rise to tort duty); Ward Development v. lngrao, 63 Md.
App. 645, 653-54,493 A.2d 421, 425-26 (1985) (implicitly finding homeowners and sub-
division developers had special relationship giving rise to a tort duty); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment h (1977) (stating that the negligent supplier of mis-
information is liable only to those individuals for whose benefit the information is sup-
plied).
Negligent misrepresentation bases liability on the defendant's relationship to the
plaintiff. It does not impose liability on an individual who makes an honest but negli-
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quired for the maintenance of a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation under Maryland law, however, have yet to be
clearly defined by the courts. The decision by the court of appeals
in Jacques v. First National Bank9 illustrates the current contours of
the relationship giving rise to a duty in a common negligence action.
Althoughjacques was a pure negligence action, its test for determin-
ing the necessary special relationship for imposing a duty of care
should be equally applicable in an action for. negligent misrepresen-
tation.10 Actions in negligence are predicated on a defendant's fail-
ure to use due care. Negligent misrepresentation may be viewed as
a subset of a negligence claim which may be maintained if it can be
shown, among other things, that the defendant "negligently" as-
serted a false statement and the plaintiff suffered damage proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's "negligence." Furthermore,
several decisions have expressly found Jacques, a pure negligence ac-
tion, applicable to the duty element in an action for negligent
misrepresentation. "
Recent decisions considering the applicability of Jacques to a
negligent misrepresentation action, however, have left Jacques' status
gent misstatement to any other person with whom he or she comes in contact. Fraud or
deceit, on the other hand, imposes liability in a broader range of relationships due to the
defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the statements and the intent to deceive. Mar-
tens, 292 Md. at 334, 439 A.2d at 538. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
9. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
10. See Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 492 A.2d 618 (1985). The relevant as-
pect of Flaherty involved an action against an attorney by a nonclient for negligent mis-
representation. The court of appeals held that contractual privity was required to
maintain a cause of action in both negligence and negligent misrepresentation for acts
resulting in economic harm. Id. at 134-35, 492 A.2d at 627-28.
The Flaherty court considered the application of the third-party beneficiary rule to
an action by mortgagors against an attorney hired by a bank to represent it at the
purchase settlement of certain property. The mortgagors asserted that the contract be-
tween the bank and the attorney was intended to benefit both the bank and the mortga-
gors. The attorney's failure to provide the mortgagors with an accurate survey of the
property resulted in pecuniary harm. In assessing the viability of the third-party benefi-
ciary claim, the court held that the nonclient "must allege and prove that the intent of
the client to benefit the nonclient was a direct purpose of the transaction or relation-
ship." Id. at 130-31, 492 A.2d at 625. In allowing the cause of action, the court relied
on the mortgagors' allegation that the hiring of the attorney "was intended to benefit
the lender as well as the purchasers in that both had identical interests in the property."
Id. at 138-39, 492 A.2d at 629. The court further reasoned that this exception to the
privity rule would "not expose the attorney to endless litigation brought by those who
might conceivably derive some indirect benefit from the contractual performance of the
attorney and his client." Id. at 131, 492 A.2d at 626.
11. See Weisman v. Connors, 312 Md. 428, 451, 540 A.2d 783, 794 (1988); Giant
Food v. Ice King, 74 Md. App. 183, 191, 536 A.2d 1182, 1185-86 (1988).
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unclear. 2 This comment will illustrate that, when Jacques is properly
applied to the duty element of a negligent misrepresentation claim,
both the contours of the requisite relationship are clearly defined
and the valid policy underlying limited tort liability in a business
context is furthered. Such a limited tort liability, i.e., allowing arm's
length commercial actors to confine their economic exposure to the
four corners of the contract, permits parties to bargain freely, ab-
sent an intent to defraud. Liability for innocent but negligent mis-
representations in a business context unjustifiably interferes with
the arm's length bargaining process, thus creating unwarranted and
unnecessary additional transaction costs.
I. THE NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION ACTION IN MARYLAND
A close analysis of the development of the negligent misrepre-
sentation action in Maryland indicates a shift from a narrow scope of
duty to an expansive reading of the duty element. Initially, Mary-
land courts required an employer-employee or a fiduciary relation-
ship to exist before imposing negligent misrepresentation liability. "
With each decision, the "special relationship" required to support
the cause of action became less demanding until finally the court of
appeals in Weisman v. Connors "4 concluded that the relationship be-
tween arm's length actors in a commercial setting was sufficient."
In 1938 the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized the tort of
negligent misrepresentation for the first time. In Virginia Dare Stores,
Inc. v. Schuman 6 the plaintiff incurred physical injury as a result of
relying on the defendant's misrepresentation. At the time of the
misrepresentation, the plaintiff and the defendant stood in an em-
ployer-employee relationship. 7 The plaintiff, who was employed to
clean the walls of a store, stepped upon a dress display case, relying
on the assurances of the employer's agent that it was strong enough
12. See Hill v. Equitable Bank, 655 F. Supp. 631, 650-51 (D. Del. 1987) (applying
Jacques to a negligent misrepresentation claim); Weisman v. Connors, 69 Md. App. 732,
745, 519 A.2d 795, 801 (1987), rev'd, 312 Md. 428, 540 A.2d 783 (1988).
13. Virginia Dare Stores, Inc. v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287, 291-92, I A.2d 897, 899
(1938) (employer-employee relationship).
14. 312 Md. 428, 540 A.2d 783 (1988).
15. Id. at 450, 540 A.2d at 794.
16. 175 Md. 287, 1 A.2d 897 (1938). A window cleaning company sent its employee
to a store to wash the walls under the direction of the store manager. The court con-
cluded that the store owner owed the employee some duty either as an employee of the
store's contractor, or as an individual doing work on the premises under the direction
and supervision of the store manager. Id. at 291, I A.2d at 901.
17. Id., I A.2d at 898.
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to support the plaintiff's weight.'"
While the court did not directly discuss the existence of a duty
to give information with care, two things can be implied from the
reasoning in Virginia Dare. First, one may reasonably infer that an
employer-employee relationship is a sufficiently close relationship
to support a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. Sec-
ond, it is reasonable to infer that the contours of the requisite nexus
go beyond the rather clear and narrow confines of such a
relationship.
The court of appeals cited the New York case of International
Products Co. v. Erie Railroad Co. '9 to support the proposition in Vir-
ginia Dare:
Liability in such cases arises only when there is a duty, if
one speaks at all, to give the correct information. And that
involves many considerations. There must be knowledge
or its equivalent that the information is desired for a seri-
ous purpose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely and
act upon it; that if false or erroneous he will because of it
be injured in person or property. Finally the relationship
of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, must be
such that in morals and good conscience the one has the
right to rely upon the other for information, and the other
giving the information owes a duty to give it with care.2 °
Thus, Maryland apparently adopted the New York rule allowing re-
covery for negligent misrepresentation if there is some business or
personal relationship, arising out of a contract or otherwise, be-
tween the parties which causes the plaintiff to rely on the words
spoken.
Ten years later in Holt v. Kolker 2" the court of appeals denied
recovery to a plaintiff who was physically injured when she relied on
statements made by both her landlord and her plumber that a porch
was safe to walk on.22 The court analyzed whether the defendants
were under a duty tothe plaintiff arising from either a previous spe-
cial relationship or any special knowledge or expertise relating to
their misstatements. 23 The court concluded that the defendants
18. Id. at 290, 1 A.2d at 900.
19. 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927).
20. Id. at 338, 155 N.E. at 664.
21. 189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948).
22. Id. at 639, 57 A.2d at 288.
23. Id. at 640, 57 A.2d at 289. From the inception of the tort in Virginia Dare, the
court has considered expertise as a factor in defining whether a duty was present. Vir-
ginia Dare Stores, Inc. v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287, 291, 1 A.2d 897, 899 (1938).
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were not under a duty to the plaintiff arising out of any previous
relationship to the plaintiff or to the property and, as a result, the
plaintiff was not entitled to rely on their statements.14
At this point in the development of the law, because Virginia
Dare and Holt involved only physical injury, the viability of a cause of
action in negligent misrepresentation for mere pecuniary loss was
questionable. The court dispelled the possibility that a claim for
nonphysical injury would be barred in Brack v. Evans.25 In Brack the
defendants were held liable for advice given to a client by one of
their employee stockbrokers.26 The court reasoned that because the
defendants possessed both a special knowledge and a special rela-
tionship, i.e., an employer-employee relationship, with the plaintiffs,
they were under a duty to give competent advice.27
The court further defined the privity requirement for a negli-
gent misrepresentation claim in St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufactur-
ers Life Insurance Co. 8 where the court held a mortgage broker liable
for negligent misrepresentations made to a developer concerning
the withdrawal of a mortgage offer by a prospective lender.2 9 As in
Brack the court adopted the theory that the defendants held them-
selves out as having knowledge in a special field causing the plain-
tiffs to rely upon such expertise.30 Significantly, the parties had no
special relationship defined by a contract in St. Paul at Chase. The
court extended the scope of duty for the tort in this case by relying
solely on the fact that the defendant possessed special knowledge
beyond that of the general public.'
Under similar reasoning, the court in Local 75, United Furniture
Workers of America v. Regiec32 held a union liable for hospital bills as a
result of union employees' misrepresentations concerning the plain-
tiff's coverage."3 The court found that a duty of care existed be-
cause the union employees were in the business of advising people
24. Holt, 189 Md. at 640, 57 A.2d at 289. The Holt court stated that "[in Maryland
there can be no recovery in an action for deceit on the ground of negligent misrepresen-
tation." id. at 639, 57 A.2d at 288. The scope of liability in deceit actions is traditionally
limited to damages for pecuniary harm. 2 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 2, § 7.2, at
381.
25. 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
26. Id. at 554, 187 A.2d at 883.
27. Id. at 551-52, 555, 187 A.2d at 882-84.
28. 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12 (1971).
29. Id. at 215, 219-20, 278 A.2d at 24-26.
30. Id. at 219-20, 278 A.2d at 25-26.
31. Id.
32. 19 Md. App. 406, 311 A.2d 456 (1973).
33. Id. at 413, 311 A.2d at 460.
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as to their coverage and that the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the
information given. 34
Thus, the Maryland courts have failed to define clearly the par-
ticular nature of the relationship necessary to support a cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation, paiticularly where the alleg-
edly negligent misrepresentations were made in the precontractual
stage of an arm's length transaction.
II. DEFINING THE NATURE OF THE DUTy ELEMENT: THE
APPLICATION OF JACQUES V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK
The court of appeals recently spoke on the issue of duty in a
negligence action for pecuniary loss. In Jacques v. First National
Bankh 5 the court considered an action in tort against a bank for the
negligent processing of a loan application.3 6 This case provided the
court with an ideal opportunity to illustrate the current contours of
the duty element in a negligence action.
In Jacques Robert and Margaret Jacques entered into a residen-
tial sales contract contingent upon their ability to obtain specified
financing. 7 The contract was further modified, requiring the Jac-
ques to increase their down payment to "whatever amount is neces-
sary to qualify for a mortgage loan." 8 The Jacques submitted an
application for a mortgage along with the contract and addendum to
the First National Bank of Maryland (the Bank). These items were
submitted along with the required processing fee for the appraisal
and credit report to initiate processing of the loan. The Bank in-
formed the Jacques that they qualified for a loan well below their
expectations. The Jacques requested that their application be re-
fused outright, to allow them to obtain a larger loan, but the Bank
refused the request under the provisions of the contract. The Jac-
ques proceeded to settlement with the Bank's mortgage loan and
obtained the balance from relatives and a short-term personal loan
of $50,000 from the Bank.39
34. Id.
35. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
36. Id. at 528, 515 A.2d at 756.
37. Id. at 528-29, 515 A.2d at 756-57. The contract provided that the Jacques secure
the purchase price of $142,000 by paying $30,000 down and the balance of $112,000
through a conventional deed of trust, due in 30 years and having interest at the rate of
12-1/4% per annum. Id.
38. By handwritten addendum, the parties agreed to the following significant modifi-
cation: "Purchaser agrees to increase the downpayment to whatever amount is neces-
sary to qualify for a mortgage loan." Id. at 529, 515 A.2d at 757.
39. 307 Md. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757.
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The Jacques sued the Bank in the Circuit Court for Montgom-
ery County on counts of malicious interference with contract, gross
negligence, and negligence.4" The jury returned a verdict in favor
of the Bank on the first two counts and in favor of theJacques on the
negligence count for $10,000."' The Jacques appealed on the
ground that the judge erred in instructing the jury concerning the
plaintiffs' duty to mitigate damages, and the Bank cross-appealed
arguing that there was no duty as a matter of law owed in the
processing of a loan application.42 The court of appeals held that
the bank owed a duty of care to the Jacques in the processing of
their loan application.43
Jacques affirmed the well-established rule in Maryland that, ab-
sent a duty of care, there can be no liability in negligence.44 The
duty element in a negligence action is " 'an obligation to which the
law will give effect and recognition to conform to a particular stan-
dard of conduct toward another.' ",41 Jacques set forth two principal
considerations for recognizing a duty of care: the nature of the in-
jury likely to result from the failure to exercise due care and the
relationship existing between the parties.4 6 Where only pecuniary
harm is likely to result from the failure to exercise due care, a special
relationship-contractual privity or its equivalent-must exist be-
tween the parties in order to impose tort liability. 47 The court de-
scribed contractual privity or its equivalent as an "intimate nexus"
necessary to maintain the cause of action. 41 While contractual priv-
ity is usually quite obvious, as illustrated by the parties in Jacques,
"its equivalent" is more difficult to recognize. The court injacques
set out three factors to make this task easier for the courts.49
Briefly, if there is no contractual privity, the court will consider
(a) the peculiar skill required of the defendant's calling,5" (b) the
40. Id. at 530-31, 515 A.2d at 757-58.
41. Id. at 531, 515 A.2d at 758.
42. Id.
43. 307 Md. at 543-44, 515 A.2d at 764.
44. Id. at 531, 515 A.2d at 758; Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 626,
510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986) (holding that police officer was not in a special relationship
with pedestrian and therefore did not have a duty to prevent drunk driver from injuring
him).
45. 307 Md. at 532, 515 A.2d at 758 (quotingJ. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 3.03,
at 18-19 (1982 & Supp. 1985)).
46. Id. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759.
47. Id. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60.
48. Id.
49. 307 Md. at 535-42, 515 A.2d at 761-64.
50. Id. at 541, 515 A.2d at 763.
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nature of the business of the party upon whom the burden is sought
to be imposed and its relationship with the public interest,51 and
(c) the magnitude of risk created by the activity.5" These variables
will be addressed seriatim.
First, the Jacques court considered Glanzer v. Shepard53 to clarify
the expertise prong of the intimate nexus requirement. In Glanzer
the New York court held a public weigher of beans liable to a buyer
for negligence in weighing, notwithstanding that there was no priv-
ity of contract between the weigher and the buyer.54 The court
found it significant that the weigher held himself out as skilled and
careful in his calling.55 As in Glanzer, the Maryland courts have held
that if occupations require a peculiar skill, a tort duty to act with
reasonable care will be imposed on those who hold themselves out
as possessing that requisite skill.5 6
Second, the court will consider the relationship of the defend-
ant's activity to the public interest when identifying an intimate
nexus between the parties.5 7 The Jacques court looked to decisions
relying heavily on the nature of the industry in deciding whether to
impose tort liability in the absence of a contractual relationship. In
Djowharzadeh v. City National Bank & Trust Co.,58 for example, the
Court of Appeals of Oklahoma imposed a tort duty on a bank to
preserve the confidentiality of information submitted by a loan ap-
plicant.5" That court relied on the close relationship between the
banking industry and public interest. Similarly, the Jacques court
cited Duffie v. Bankers' Life Association of Des Moines, 6° in which the
Supreme Court of Iowa imposed a duty to act promptly when
processing submitted applications, reasoning that an insurance
company is affected with a public interest because it can operate
51. Id. at 541-42, 515 A.2d at 763-64.
52. Id. at 537, 515 A.2d at 761.
53. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (CardozoJ.).
54. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 276.
55. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275-76. Compare Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y.
170, 188, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931), in which the same court held public accountants
who carelessly prepared balance sheets could not be held liable to the plaintiff who
made loans in reliance upon the balance sheet. That court distinguished Glanzer v.
Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 238-39, 135 N.E. 275, 275-76 (1922), by finding that there was
no contractual relation or even one approaching it that imposed any duty to the indeter-
minate class of persons who may rely on the audit. 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
56. St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 219-20, 278
A.2d 12, 25-26 (1971). See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
57. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 543, 515 A.2d 756, 764 (1986).
58. 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).
59. Id. at 619-20.
60. 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913).
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only under a state franchise.6
While the court considered the public nature of the business in
Jacques, it pointed out that it was not necessarily assigning this part
of the test as much weight as the Iowa and Oklahoma courts had.62
Because the court found a contractual relation to exist, it was not
necessary for it to determine the Bank's liability absent a contract. 63
The third prong in determining whether an intimate nexus ex-
ists evaluates the magnitude of risk created by the activity." InJac-
ques the court found compelling the fact that the Bank was on notice
of the great potential for economic harm that its negligence could
cause the plaintiff.65
Thus,Jacques stands for the proposition that in the absence of
contractual privity, an action in negligence for economic harm will
fail for a lack of duty unless the defendant's business (1) is con-
nected to the public interest, (2) requires special knowledge or ex-
pertise not available to the general public, and (3) creates great and
foreseeable economic harm in light of its business setting. A correct
reading of Jacques would require the court to find either contractual
privity or the satisfaction of the above elements before allowing the
claim to proceed.
Post-Jacques negligent misrepresentation cases in Maryland,
however, have failed to apply this analysis. The predictable result is
that commercial parties acting at arm's length are deprived of the
commercial certainty previously provided by the privity requirement
of an action in tort.
In 1982 the court of appeals considered such a negligent mis-
representation action in Martns Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney. 66 The court
held that a seller could be liable to a buyer for negligent misrepre-
sentations made in the precontractual stage of an arm's length
61. Id. at 25, 139 N.W. at 1089-90.
62. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 542, 515 A.2d 756, 763 (1986).
63. Id. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762.
64. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
65. 307 Md. at 540-41, 515 A.2d at 762-63. Once the First National Bank of Mary-
land (the Bank) accepted the loan application for processing, the Jacques were "legally
obligated to either proceed to settlement with the loan determined by the Bank or for-
feit their deposit of $10,000 and lose any benefit of their bargain." Id. at 541, 515 A.2d
at 763. See Council of Co-Owners of Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner
Constr. Co., 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986), where the court held that the "determi-
nation of whether a duty will be imposed . . . should depend upon the risk generated by
the negligent conduct, rather than upon the fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the
resultant damage." Id. at 35, 517 A.2d at 345.
66. 292 Md, 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982).
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agreement.67 Martens represented a departure from previous case
law by imposing liability on a defendant who stood neither in con-
tractual privity with the plaintiff nor worked in a field traditionally
requiring a higher duty to the general public. 68 Likewise, in 1988
the court of appeals affirmed this departure in Weisman v. Connors69
where liability was imposed for misrepresentations made to a pro-
spective employee. The court in Weisman applied Jacques to a negli-
gent misrepresentation claim and found that the requisite privity or
its equivalent had been established by the precontractual negotia-
tions of the parties. 7' This conclusion created a degree of uncer-
tainty as to the status ofJacques. IfJacques meant that privity must be
shown by a contract or its equivalent, and that this equivalent could
be established by a consideration of the three factors noted above,
then the Weisman result is inexplicable. That is, the Jacques deci-
sion,7  and subsequent cases applying its rationale to negligent mis-
representation claims,72 proposed that the expansion of liability into
the precontractual stage of an arm's length transaction was ill
advised.
III. JACQUES AND A NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM
ARISING OUT OF AN ARM'S LENGTH TRANSACTION
In Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney73 the court of appeals affirmed
that the tort of negligent misrepresentation exists in Maryland. The
Martens court considered the development of the tort and concluded
that negligent misrepresentation may be established by a showing of
the five principal elements stated previously.74 The court specifi-
cally found that a negligent misrepresentation claim may be applied
to statements made in connection with the consummation of an
arm's length transaction.75
In Martens Henry J. Marten, Jr. and his son, Henry J. Marten,
67. Id. at 338-39 n.7, 439 A.2d at 53940 n. 7 .
68. Note that in the previous Maryland decisions involving pecuniary loss, there
either existed a contractual relationship, see, e.g., Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d
880 (1963); Local 75, United Furniture Workers of Am. v. Regiec, 19 Md. App. 406, 311
A.2d 456 (1973), or the defendants held themselves out as having expert knowledge in a
special field not available to the plaintiffs, see, e.g., St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufactur-
ers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12 (1971).
69. 312 Md. 428, 540 A.2d 783 (1988).
70. Id. at 449, 540 A.2d at 793.
71. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
72. See cases cited supra note 12.
73. 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982).
74. Id. at 337, 439 A.2d at 539. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 338 n.7, 439 A.2d at 539-40 n.7.
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III, entered into negotiations for the purchase of a car dealership
owned by Howard F. Seney. During the precontractual negotia-
tions, the Martens informed Seney that they intended to continue
operation of the dealership and therefore requested information
about the corporation's financial status. Seney provided the Mar-
tens with a handwritten financial trend sheet. The sheet indicated a
profitable enterprise, but, unknown to the buyers, failed to make
adjustments for bonuses and taxes. The Martens made repeated re-
quests to see audited financial statements but were told that none
existed. In reliance on the handwritten financial trend sheet, the
Martens purchased the franchise from Seney. 6 After six months,
the newly owned business experienced a $187,000 loss.7"
The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation.78 The trial judge directed a verdict in
favor of the defendants "seemingly on the ground that the cause of
action does not exist in this State. ' 79 The court of appeals reversed
the lower court, affirmed the existence of the claim in Maryland, and
rejected the defendants' argument that the cause of action does not
apply to parties acting at arm's length.80 Martens was decided four
years before the court of appeals' decision in Jacques.
Post-Jacques decisions suggest that applying Jacques to a negli-
gent misrepresentation claim gives substance to the "special rela-
tionship" required to support the cause of action."' A reasoned
policy analysis underlying the imposition of tort liability for purely
economic harm indicates not only that the Jacques analysis is appro-
priately applied to the duty requirement of an action for negligent
misrepresentation, but that the valid policy concerns underlying the
limitation of liability would be furthered by such application.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Jacques was intended to
clarify the situations in which a tort action for economic loss would
be allowed to proceed.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals considered the applica-
tion of Jacques to a negligent misrepresentation claim for the first
time in Weisman v. Connors. 8 2 The court considered whether misrep-
resentations made to a prospective employee were actionable. In
76. Id. at 331-32, 439 A.2d at 536-37.
77. 292 Md. at 332, 439 A.2d at 537.
78. Id. at 330, 439 A.2d at 536.
79. Id. at 337, 439 A.2d at 539.
80. Id. at 337-38, 439 A.2d at 539-40.
81. See cases cited supra note 12.
82. 69 Md. App. 732, 519 A.2d 795 (1987).
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Weisman, the plaintiff, Arthur Connors, was asked by the defendant,
Frederick Weisman, to leave his job as vice president of Ford Motor
Company (FMC) to join Weisman's company as executive vice presi-
dent. Connors resigned his post at FMC in reliance on various
statements made by Weisman in connection with his new employ-
ment. Several promises made by Weisman never came to pass. 3
Two years after he joined Weisman's company, Connors re-
signed and filed suit alleging, among other things, negligent misrep-
resentation. The trial court entered a verdict in favor of Connors,
and Weisman appealed, arguing that the relationship between the
parties did not give rise to a duty of care to support a cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation.8 4
Apparently, Weisman asked the court to apply a plain reading
ofJacques to the duty element of the case, requiring contractual priv-
ity, or in the alternative to find that he was not engaged in activity
giving rise to liability in the absence of privity.85 As noted, Jacques
would require contractual privity or its equivalent in order to im-
pose liability in negligence for pecuniary loss, an element not pres-
ent in Weisman.86 If the court were to accept this interpretation of
Jacques, parties acting at arm's length should be shielded from liabil-
ity for negligent misrepresentations in the precontractual stage of a
negotiation.
The intermediate appellate court in Weisman dismissed the ap-
plication ofJacques by finding that "[w]hileJacques contains an excel-
lent exposition of the nature and elements of tortious negligence,
we fail to see how it affects this case. There is nothing in Jacques that
purports to modify the principles set forth in Martens Chevrolet.""7
This assumption misses the mark. A careful review of Maryland
cases indicates that the duty of care owed in an action for negligent
misrepresentation resulting in economic harm has the same scope
83. Id. at 736, 519 A.2d at 788.
84. Id. at 745, 519 A.2d at 788.
85. Id. at 745 n.4, 519 A.2d at 801 n.4. "At oral argument appellants laid great
stress on the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Jacques v. First National Bank."
Id.
86. Jacques mandates that before liability for negligence resulting solely in economic
harm will be imposed, the plaintiff and defendant must stand in contractual privity or its
equivalent. Absent contractual privity, liability may also be imposed underJacques after
consideration of (1) the nature of the defendant's business; (2) whether the defendant
possesses special skill or knowledge; and (3) the foreseeability of harm. Jacques v. First
Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 541, 515 A.2d 756, 763 (1986). In Weisman, neither contrac-
tual privity nor these criteria were satisfied.
87. Weisman, 69 Md. App. at 745 n.4, 519 A.2d at 801 n.4.
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as the duty of care in a negligence action for the same harm. a8
The court of appeals granted Weisman's petition for certiorari
to consider several questions relating to whether the evidence sup-
ported a negligent misrepresentation claim and, if so, whether the
jury employed the proper theory of damages in making its award.8 9
Weisman argued that his alleged failure to exercise due care "cre-
ates only a risk of economic loss, [and] an intimate nexus between
the parties, i.e., contractual privity or its equivalent, is required as a
condition to the imposition of tort liability."90 Weisman further ar-
gued that commercial expectations are protected by contract and
not by negligence actions. 9 '
The court of appeals reviewed the relevant Maryland law on
negligent misrepresentation and concluded that the "requisite priv-
ity of contract or its equivalent, essential to the establishment of a
tort duty of care, as required by Martens and Jacques, was an issue
properly submitted to the jury on the evidence adduced at the
trial."92 Although the Weisman court cited Jacques when it consid-
ered the duty issue, it did not apply the Jacques three-prong analy-
sis93 in determining the scope of liability in tort for economic harm,
as Jacques indicates is required in the absence of contractual privity.
Instead, the court held that the "jury could have found from the
evidence that the circumstances under which the two men came to-
gether in precontractual negotiations created a sufficiently close
nexus or relationship as to impose a duty on Weisman not negli-
gently to make statements .... "9'
A proper application of the Jacques holding was illustrated in
Hill v. Equitable Bank " where the federal district court in Delaware,
applying Maryland law, held that a bank could be held liable for
negligent misrepresentation relating to inducements leading to the
plaintiff's participation in an ultimately unprofitable real estate part-
nership. 96 The court closely followed the reasoning in Jacques, first
by finding a contractual relationship and, second, by identifying the
relevant policy concerns underlying the imposition of liability on a
88. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
89. Weisman v. Connors, 312 Md. 428, 440-41, 540 A.2d 783, 789 (1988).
90. Id. at 441, 540 A.2d at 789.
91. Id. at 442, 540 A.2d at 790.
92. Id. at 458, 540 A.2d at 794.
93. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
94. Weisman, 312 Md. at 448, 540 A.2d at 793.
95. 655 F. Supp. 631 (D. Del. 1987).
96. Id. at 650.
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bank under the circumstances.97 The court held that the parties
possessed the relationship required byJacques to maintain a cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation.98 The court reasoned that
opening accounts and fostering a business relationship with the de-
fendant bank created the requisite contractual relationship giving
rise to tort liability for negligent misrepresentation.9 9
The Delaware court also considered the three factors noted by
the Maryland court in Jacques 0 and held that the Delaware bank
satisfied these criteria as well.' The Delaware court followed the
reasoning in Jacques stating that
[t]he banking business is affected with the public interest.
Traditionally banks and their officers have been held to a
high degree of integrity and responsiveness to their public
calling. Although not directly applicable to the respondent
because of its status as a national bank, the requirements
imposed by the Maryland Legislature upon state banks il-
lustrate this State's policy concerning the banking industry
The recognition of a tort duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances presented by this case is thus con-
sistent with the policy of this State as expressed by the Leg-
islature, and reasonable in light of the nature of the
banking industry and its relation to public welfare.'0 2
Significantly, the court found this policy rationale equally appropri-
ate to finding a duty under a negligent misrepresentation claim.'°s
Judging from the court of appeals' decision in Weisman, it is
apparent that the court will apply Jacques to a negligent misrepresen-
tation claim in the future. What is not clear, however, is the manner
in which Jacques will be applied. A reading of Jacques, as suggested
by the Weisman decision, will do little to establish appropriate and
easily discernable perimeters of liability for negligent
misrepresentation.
IV. SUMMARY
Jacques provided the court with the opportunity to move closer
97. Id.
98. Id. at 651.
99. 655 F. Supp. at 651.
100. Id. at 650-51.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 650.
103. 655 F. Supp. at 651. The court stated that "the policy rationale (applied in Jac-
quesl is equally appropriate to finding a duty against negligent misrepresentation under
the facts of this case." Id.
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to establishing a more consistent analytical framework for the duty
element in a tort action for economic harm. The court in Weisman
confused the issue by not applying the sound analysis and the plain
language of its previous decision in Jacques.
Although Weisman correctly recognized that "Jacques contains an
excellent exposition of the nature and elements of tortious negli-
gence,"'o4 it incorrectly applied the Jacques three-prong test.' 05 Jac-
ques explicitly indicates that a contract must have been formed in
order to give rise to liability in negligence for economic harm.' °6
Because Jacques should be applied when defining the duty element
for negligent misrepresentation, the lack of contractual privity or its
equivalent would bar a claim for negligent misrepresentation when
the parties act at arm's length. Jacques suggests that a duty should be
found in the absence of contractual privity only after considering
the nature of the defendant's business, the magnitude of risk, and
the public interest."10
An example of the dangers inherent in expanding the duty ele-
ment beyond the perimeters set by Jacques may be found in Giant
Food v. Ice King'"° where the court of special appeals purported to
apply Jacques to a negligent misrepresentation claim.' 09 That court
failed to apply the three-prong analysis in the absence of contractual
privity. The court found that a "full-fledged" business relationship
indicated the presence of an " 'intimate nexus' akin to a contractual
relationship or its 'equivalent' " to support a cause of action for neg-
ligent misrepresentation."" The indeterminate boundaries set by
this full fledged "business relationship" test create commercial un-
certainty for parties seeking to enter into new contracts.
In Ice King the court relied on several communications between
the parties concerning the possibility of entering into a contract to
supply ice. Conversations between the plaintiff, Ice King, and the
defendant, Giant Food (Giant), included: (1) the type, price, and
quantity of ice; (2) the delivery terms; (3) the location of Ice King's
plant; (4) the size of the storage facility needed to satisfy Giant's
demand; (5) Giant's authorization of the plaintiff's statement on a
loan application that Giant was going to buy ice from Ice King;
104. Weisman v. Connors, 69 Md. App. 732, 745 n.4, 519 A.2d 795, 801 n.4 (1987).
105. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
106. 307 Md. 527, 534-35, 515 A.2d 756, 759-60 (1986).
107. Id. at 541-42, 515 A.2d at 763. See St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life
Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 219-20, 278 A.2d 12. 26 (1971).
108. 74 Md. App, 183, 536 A.2d 1182 (1988).
109. Id. at 191, 536 A.2d at 1185-86.
110. Id., 536 A.2d at 1185 (quotingJacques, 307 Md. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60).
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(6) Giant's assurances that everything was "all right"; (7) arrange-
ments for the inspection of Ice King's plant; and (8) Giant's demand
for further samples." ' The court concluded that these communica-
tions constituted a full-fledged business relationship indicating the
presence of an intimate nexus.' 12
Despite its decision to apply Jacques, the Giant Food court pro-
ceeded to ignore the three-prong test, as did the court in Weisman,
to determine whether the required intimate nexus was satisfied." 3
Although the court could discern no contract between the plaintiff
and the defendant, it found that the relationship between the parties
gave rise to a tort duty." 4 This conclusion was rather incredible in
light of the fact that a grocery store, unlike a bank or a brokerage
house, has: (a) little connection with the public interest; (b) no re-
quirement of professional knowledge or expertise; and (c) created a
slight and foreseeable risk in light of its commercial setting." ' Af-
ter Weisman and Ice King, parties seeking to enter into contracts at
arm's length will be venturing into uncharted waters with the threat
of tort liability for innocent misrepresentations in the precontractual
bargaining stage.
A review of the factors mandated by Jacques militates against the
imposition of liability in negligence for the acts or words of an arm's
length actor in precontractual negotiations. Arm's length transac-
tions, by definition, do not involve unequal bargaining positions as a
result of the possession of peculiar skills required of a particular
profession." 6 In addition, a business acting at arm's length with
other commercially sophisticated parties generally has a close rela-
tionship with the public interest, investing it with enormous public
trust which expects a high degree of integrity." 17 Further, the mag-
nitude of risk involved in bargaining at arm's length is well within
the contemplation of both parties to the transaction. Ironically, the
imposition of liability in tort for negligent misrepresentations in
these circumstances removes the possibility of commercial certainty.
The policy underlying the requirement of a higher standard of
care for professionals' " is inapplicable to parties acting at arm's
length. Transactions between laypersons and professionals neces-
Ill. Id.
112. 74 Md. App. at 191, 536 A.2d at 1185.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 192, 536 A.2d at 1186.
115. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
117. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 542, 515 A.2d 756, 763 (1986).
118. See supra note 3.
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sarily involve unequal bargaining positions due to the unequal ac-
cess to specialized knowledge. Consequently, the court is left to
weigh the potential for vast tort liability for economic harm, a result
it has already sworn to avoid,'' 9 against creating an incentive for
parties at arm's length to deal fairly' 20 with each other, which lies
arguably within the province of the legislature and not the court. In
addition, liability for fraud arguably provides a sufficient safeguard
for the fair dealing goal. 12 ' Absent a specific intent to defraud, the
law should "encourage the flow of commercial information upon
which the operation of the economy rests ... for no interest of soci-
ety is served by promoting the flow of information not genuinely
believed by its maker to be true."122
Accordingly, the Maryland courts should follow and apply a
plain reading of'Jacques in order to define the duty element in a neg-
ligent misrepresentation claim. Significantly, the federal district
court in Hill found no difficulty in applyingJacques. Admittedly, the
Hill court was presented with an "easy" case and its ultimate deter-
mination would have been the same with or without a consideration
of Jacques. Likewise, Marten. would have concluded that a duty ex-
119. 307 Md. at 537, 515 A.2d at 761. Jacques declared that
[a]s the magnitude of the risk increases, the requirement of privity is relaxed-
thus justifying the imposition of a duty in favor of a large class of persons where
the risk is of death or personal injury. Conversely, as the magnitude of the risk
decreases, a closer relationship between the parties must be shown to support a
tort duty. Therefore, if the risk created by negligent conduct is no greater than
one of economic loss. generally no tort duty will be found absent a showing of
privity or its equivalent.
Id.
120. Although a duty of fair dealing generally is now imposed on the parties to a
contract, that duty is not formulated so as to extend to precontractual negotiations. See
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 & comment c
(1979).
121. It is significant that the court in Jacques cited with approval the holding of the
New York court in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). The
court stated that
[i]n the absence of the intimate nexus found in Glanzer, the Ultramares court
concluded that the accountants might be liable to the factor for deceit, but not
for negligence alone. "lilf there has been neither reckless misstatement nor
insincere profession of an opinion, but only an honest blunder, the ensuing
liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is to be en-
forced between the parties by whom the contract has been made."
Jacques, 307 Md. at 536, 515 A.2d at 760 (quoting Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at
448).
For recovery in deceit, Maryland law requires that fraud be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. See Loyola Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Trenchcraft, Inc., 17 Md.
App. 646, 656, 303 A.2d 432, 438 (1973).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
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isted even without considering the party's unequal bargaining posi-
tions. Nevertheless, the Hill court recognized the impact that a
plain reading of Jacques should have on a negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim, and considered the Jacques three-factor analysis before
determining that a duty existed.
V. CONCLUSION
A reasoned analysis of the policy underlying the imposition of
tort liability for purely economic harm indicates not only that the
Jacques analysis is appropriately applied to the duty requirement of
an action for negligent misrepresentation, but that the valid policy
concerns underlying the limitation would be furthered by such ap-
plication. The imposition of tort liability for innocent but negligent
misrepresentations in the precontractual stage of an arm's length
transaction goes beyond the contours of liability suggested by a
plain reading of Jacques.
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